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ABSTRACT
A complex message from space may require the use of computers to display, analyze and understand.
Such a message cannot be decontaminated with certainty, and technical risks remain which can pose
an existential threat. Complex messages would need to be destroyed in the risk averse case.
1. INTRODUCTION
The search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI) has
provoked many critical discussions on technical and
philosophical levels (C´irkovic´ 2013). It is much debated
whether contact with ETI would benefit or harm hu-
manity (Baum et al. 2011; Shostak 2014; Brin 2014;
Billingham & Benford 2014), and whether mankind
should (Benford 2014; Gertz 2016b) or should not
(Zaitsev 2011; Vakoch 2016) keep quiet in order to
protect Earth from threats, or even “cloak” our planet
using lasers to compensate for Earth’s transit signatures
(Kipping & Teachey 2016).
One of the scenarios considered in the literature
is the reception of an ETI message through electro-
magnetic radiation, e.g. through a radio telescope
(Cocconi & Morrison 1959). Alternatively, a message
might be found in the form of, or through, an alien
probe, as first suggested by Bracewell (1960). It was
suggested to search the solar system for non-terrestrial
artifacts (Papagiannis 1995; Tough & Lemarchand
2004; Haqq-Misra & Kopparapu 2012), particularly
for starships (Martin & Bond 1980) in addition to
classical SETI (Gertz 2016a). In our solar system,
probes are speculated to be in geocentric, selenocen-
tric, Earth-Moon libration, and Earth-Moon halo or-
bits (Freitas & Valdes 1980; Valdes & Freitas 1983;
Freitas 1983), or buried on the moon (Clarke & Kubrick
1993). Alternative ideas include the Kuiper belt
(Loeb & Turner 2012), general technosignatures (Wright
2017), or even “footprints of alien technology on Earth”
(Davies 2012).
While it has been argued that sustainable ETI is un-
likely to be harmful (Baum et al. 2011), we can not ex-
clude this possibility. After all, it is cheaper for ETI to
send a malicious message to eradicate humans compared
to sending battleships.
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If ETI exist, there will be a plurality of good and bad
civilizations. Perhaps there are few bad ETI, but we
cannot know for sure the intentions of the senders of a
message. Consequently, there have been calls that SETI
signals need to be “decontaminated” (Carrigan 2004,
2006).
In this paper, we show that it is impossible to decon-
taminate a message with certainty. Instead, complex
messages would need to be destroyed after reception in
the risk averse case.
2. MESSAGE TYPES
There are several possible threats from an ETI mes-
sage. On the most basic level, a message might repre-
sent a statement like “We will make your sun go super-
nova tomorrow”. True or not, it could cause wide-spread
panic. More realistically, a longer text could have a de-
moralizing cultural influence. For example, it is debated
whether the Roman Empire was destroyed by the bible
(McGiffert 1909).
We now follow along the (perhaps more likely) case
that the hypothetical message is not very short, and
non-trivial in content. As an example, the message
from the “SETI Decrypt Challenge” (Heller 2017)
was a stream of 1,902,341 bits, which is the prod-
uct of prime numbers. Like the Arecibo message
(Staff At The National Astronomy Ionosphere Center
1975) and Evpatoria’s “Cosmic Calls” (Shuch 2011),
the bits represent the X/Y black/white pixel map of an
image. When this is understood, further analysis could
be done off-line by printing on paper. Any harm would
then come from the meaning of the message, and not
from embedded viruses or other technical issues.
If such a message is received only in one place, and
only once, it might be possible to contain it and its
harmful consequences, or even destroy it. If it is received
repeatedly, perhaps even by amateurs, containment is
impossible. As a further complication, the International
Academy of Astronautics has adopted a “Declaration of
Principles Concerning Activities Following the Detec-
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tion of Extraterrestrial Intelligence” which states1 that
“These recordings should be made available to the inter-
national institutions listed above and to members of the
scientific community for further objective analysis and
interpretation.” This view is shared by the majority of
SETI scientists (Gertz 2017).
3. THE NEED FOR A PRISON
We continue with a hypothetical message which ap-
pears to be, at first sight, positive and interesting, and
shall be analyzed in depth. Any message could, in prin-
ciple, be examined on paper. For many plausible mes-
sage types, however, it is much more convenient to use
a computer. Even the simple LATEX notation is difficult
to read as code. Consider the proof of the Riemann
hypothesis, which begins with the equation
\zeta(s)=\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\frac{1}{n^s}=
\prod_{p\\text{prim}}\frac{1}{1\frac1{p^s}}=
\frac1{\left(1-\frac1{2^s}\right)\left(1-\frac1
{3^s}\right)\left(1-\frac1{5^s}\right)\dotsm}
which is much easier to read when interpreted and
finely printed as
ζ(s) =
∞∑
n=1
1
ns
=
∏
p prim
1
1− 1
ps
=
1(
1− 1
2s
) (
1− 1
3s
) (
1− 1
5s
)
· · ·
.
(1)
Even a typesetting system such as TEX is a Turing-
complete programming language (Greene 1990), so that
the message is in fact code, and may contain a malicious
virus. Messages may contain large technical diagrams,
equations, algorithms etc. which can not reasonably be
printed and examined manually. In addition, the mes-
sage itself might be compressed to increase interstellar
data rates, and the decompression algorithm would be
code. Executing billions of decompression instructions
cannot plausibly be performed manually and requires
the use of a computer. But then, the computer would
execute potentially harmful ETI code. For this case, it
was suggested to use isolated, quarantined machines for
analysis (Carrigan 2004, 2006).
In the following section, we explain why these mea-
sures are insufficient, and no safety procedure exists to
contain all threats.
4. THERE IS NO PERFECT PRISON
Consider a large ETI message with a header that con-
tains a statement such as “We are friends. The galactic
library is attached. It is in the form of an artificial in-
telligence (AI) which quickly learns your language and
1 http://www.setileague.org/iaaseti/protdet.htm
will answer your questions. You may execute the code
following these instructions...”
We assume that the message is available only to a
small group of people, part of a government body, who
decide to keep it private, but follow their curiosity and
examine it with utmost care. A computer in a box on
the moon is built to execute the code. Safety devices
are in place, their design by choice of the reader, such
as remote-controlled fusion bombs to terminate the ex-
periment at any time.
This scenario resembles the Oracle-AI, or AI box, of
an isolated computer system where a possibly dangerous
AI is “imprisoned” with only minimalist communica-
tion channels. Current research indicates that even well-
designed boxes are useless, and a sufficiently intelligent
AI will be able to persuade or trick its human keepers
into releasing it (Armstrong et al. 2012; Dawson et al.
2016).
For the escape, we have to assume that researchers en-
gage in a conversion with the AI (without, there would
be no benefit in running the experiment in the first
place). In such a text conversion, the AI might offer
things of value, such as a cure for cancer, and make a
small request in exchange, such as a 10% increase in
its computer capacity. It appears rational to take the
offer. When we do, we have begun business and trade
with it, which has no clear limit. If the cure for can-
cer would consist of blueprints for nanobots: should we
build these, and release them into the world, in the case
that we don’t understand how they work? We could de-
cline such offers, but shall not forget that humans are
involved in this experiment. Consider a nightly conver-
sation between the AI and a guard: “Your daughter is
dying from cancer. I give you the cure for the small price
of...”. We can never exclude human error and emotions.
After all, is it ethical to keep a sentience in a prison when
it expresses incredible pain due to small manufacturing
errors from building the box?
Even in a military-style, adamant experiment, there
will still be humans involved who go home after exami-
nation work with their own feelings. Even if everything
is officially secret, whistle-blowers might get some news
out to the public. Quickly, there could be a community
on Earth in favor of letting it out for religious, philosoph-
ical etc. reasons. If the AI promises to cure cancer, or
offers a message of salvation, a cult could form. Maybe
(or maybe not) a majority of the population would be
in favor of releasing the AI. Should, or even could, a
democratic government work against the majority of its
people? Dictatorships are unstable and eventually over-
thrown; the AI will be eventually released.
5. PRISON ESCAPE
With a non-zero prison escape probability in any sin-
gle time period, the AI will be free at some point of
time. Then, the worst possible result would be human
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extinction or some other unrecoverable global catastro-
phe (Bostrom 2014). The main argument is that the hu-
man species currently dominates planet Earth because
of our intelligence. If ETI-AI is superior, it might (or
might not) become more powerful and consider us as
irrelevant monkeys (or maybe not).
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As we realize that some message types are potentially
dangerous, we can adapt our own peaceful transmissions
accordingly. We should certainly not transmit any code.
Instead, a plain text encyclopedia (Heidmann 1993), im-
ages, music etc. in a simple format are adequate. No
advanced computer should be required to decrypt our
message.
Our main argument is that a message from ETI can-
not be decontaminated with certainty. For anything
more complex than easily printable images or plain text,
the technical risks are impossible to assess beforehand.
We may only choose to destroy such a message, or take
the risk. The risk for humanity may be small, but not
zero. The probability of encountering malicious ETI
first might be very low. Perhaps it is much more likely
to receive a message from positive ETI. Also, the poten-
tial benefits from joining a galactic network might be
considerable (Baum 2014).
It is always wise to understand the risks and chances
beforehand, and make a conscious choice for, or against
it, rather than blindly following a random path. Overall,
we believe that the risk is very small (but not zero),
and the potential benefit very large, so that we strongly
encourage to read an incoming message.
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